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AMENDING CODES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT TO IMPOSE
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS ON
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS
Hugh D. Spitzer and Phillip A. Talmadge
Every judicial campaign year, millions of dollars pour into
individual court races around the country. The bulk of that
money is donated by lawyers, businesses, and others with
financial interests in how judges, especially appellate judges,
decide cases. United States Supreme Court rulings on political
contributions and spending have hamstrung the ability of states
to control largescale expenditures in judicial races. This essay
reviews empirical research by political scientists who have
documented the effect of large campaign donations on how
judges decide cases and on the public’s perception of court
impartiality. It describes how legislatures and courts have
addressed (or failed to address) the flood of money into judicial
races. The essay then proposes a number of actions that state
courts and legislatures could take to control judicial campaign
spending. First, we recommend that in jurisdictions with
inadequate statutory judicial campaign controls, state supreme
courts should act forcefully to impose strict caps on both direct
and coordinated contributions to judicial campaigns, using the
American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
Rule 4.4(B)(1). Second, we suggest that state codes of judicial
conduct should integrate the parallel mandatory disqualification
mechanism in the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule
2.11(A). Next, we contend that legislatures have sufficient cause
under a strict scrutiny test to protect judicial impartiality and
the appearance of impartiality by limiting total judicial
campaign committee expenditures and controlling independent
expenditures by outside groups. Further, we assert that if
legislatures fail to act, the courts themselves have sufficient
inherent authority to impose those expenditure limits. Finally, we
urge states to adopt public funding systems for judicial
campaigns, and we argue that the need for judicial impartiality
should provide legislatures with sufficient cause to adopt
restrictions that would not be constitutionally acceptable in nonjudicial campaigns.
Magna Carta, 1215, para. 40: “To no one will
we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”
INTRODUCTION

E

VERY judicial election year, millions of dollars pour into individual
court races around the country. The Brennan Center at New York
University’s School of Law reports that outside groups spent an
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estimated $19.4 million on judicial campaign television ads in the 201516 cycle, a 44 percent increase over the 2011-12 period.1 Much of that
money comes from independent groups whose funders are difficult to
identify.2 As of 2013, only a dozen states appointed their highest
appellate courts with no electoral participation.3 Fifteen used nonpartisan
elections, seven carried out partisan elections, and the others either use
some form of appointment plus a retention election or an open
nonpartisan election.4 States with partisan elections for judgeships
typically witness the largest judicial campaign expenditures.5
Some political scientists observe that massive judicial campaign
spending increases voter interest and participation,6 which would
1

Spending By Outside Groups in Judicial Races Hits Record High, Secret
Money
Dominates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.or
g/press-release/spending-outside-groups-judicial-races-hits-record-high-secretmoney-dominates [https://perma.cc/X5LE-9TDZ]. For an analysis of where
money is concentrated in judicial elections, and why, see Chris W. Bonneau,
What Price Justice(s)? Understanding Campaign Spending in State Supreme
Court Elections, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 107 (2005).
2
Paul Blumenthal, This Dark Money Group Is Spending Big on Judicial
Races,
And
No One Knows Why, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/entry/dark-money-judicial-races-center-for-individualfreedom_us_581b5234e4b0c43e6c1e7
40d [https://perma.cc/6KJB-U96Z].
3
MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: HOW CAMPAIGN
ADVERTISING INFLUENCES STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 37 (2015). For
state-by-state summaries of judicial selection, see Methods of Judicial Selection,
CTR.
FOR
S T.
CTS.,
NAT’L
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.
cfm?state= [https://perma.cc/G7HG-5FT4] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Methods of Judicial Selection]; Judicial Selection in the States: Overview,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_the_states [https://perma.cc/G8QCBCXH].
4
Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 3.
5
Linda Casey, Courting Donors: Money in Judicial Elections, 2011
and
2012,
NAT’L
INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POL. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.followthemoney.org/r
esearch/institute-reports/courting-donors-money-in-judicial-elections-2011-and2012/ [https://perma.cc/2CXD-78TY].
6
HALL, supra note 3, at 4, 161. In her book, Hall focuses on negative
campaign advertising, and concludes “that attack airings mobilize voters in nonpartisan state supreme court elections.” HALL, supra note 3, at 161. See also
Lawrence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial
Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND
LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 140, 161 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007);
Chris W. Bonneau & Matthew J. Streb, White Noise: The Unrealized Effects of
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White on Judicial Elections, 32 JUST. SYS. J.
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normally be a cause for celebration. Other political scientists, as well as
many judges, lawyers and legal academics, focus on the sinister side of
court campaign spending—particularly expenditures to attack sitting
judges viewed as unfriendly to special interest groups or to elect
candidates seen as friendlier to those groups. The main concerns are that
large judicial campaign contributions will influence how judges decide
cases (which happens, according to researchers7), and that the public’s
confidence in the legal system will decline because people will believe
that big money buys judicial outcomes and undermines perceptions of
judicial fairness and legitimacy (which political scientists have also
documented8).
Many state legislatures have enacted statutes limiting individual and
corporate contributions to judicial campaigns, but eight states that use
judicial elections or retention votes have little or no controls on
individual or PAC contributions to campaign committees.9 Further, the
reach of contribution and spending limits has been constrained by First
Amendment cases such as Republican Party of Minnesota v. White10 and
Citizens United v. FEC.11

247, 261–63 (2011); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Does Money Buy
Voters? Campaign Spending and Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court
Elections
(Feb.
1,
2007),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1009671
[https://perma.cc/J8KB-DJGV].
7
See Damon M. Cann, Campaign Contributions and Judicial Behavior, 23 AM. REV. POL. 261 (2002); Morgan L.W. Hazelton et al., Does Public
Financing Affect Judicial Behavior? Evidence From the North Carolina Supreme Court, 44 AM. POL. RES. 587 (2016); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M.
Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts: The Empirical Relationship
between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. S161 (2015); Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, The Effect of
Campaign Contributions on Judicial Decisionmaking (Feb. 4, 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337668
[https://perma.cc/7FAD-ZKJJ]. Interestingly, in those states with partisan judicial elections, the relationship between political party contributions and partisan
voting appears to be stronger for Republican judges than for Democrats. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts:
The Empirical Relationship between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S161 (2015).
8
James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Judicial Impartiality, Campaign Contributions, and Recusals: Results from a National Survey, 10 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 76 (2013).
9
Judicial Campaigns and Elections, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/ca
mpaign_financing.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/R9VB-25KV] (last visited July
28, 2017).
10
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
11
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Part II of this essay describes United States Supreme Court rulings
that have reduced state control over largescale spending in court races, as
well as more recent decisions that provide hope for new parameters on
judicial campaign contributions—particularly limits set by the courts
themselves through codes of judicial conduct. Part III reviews empirical
research by political scientists who have documented the effect of large
campaign donations on how judges decide cases and on the public’s
perception of court impartiality. Part IV describes how legislatures and
courts have addressed (or not addressed) the flood of money into judicial
races. Part V proposes a package of actions by state courts and
legislatures to control spending in judicial elections. First, we
recommend that in jurisdictions with inadequate statutory judicial
campaign controls, state supreme courts should act forcefully to impose
strict caps on both direct and coordinated contributions to judicial
campaigns, using the mechanism suggested by the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.4(B)(1).12
Second, state codes of judicial conduct should integrate the parallel
mandatory disqualification mechanism in the ABA’s Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11(A). Third, we contend that legislatures have
sufficient cause under a strict scrutiny test to protect judicial impartiality
and the appearance of impartiality by limiting total judicial campaign
committee expenditures and controlling independent expenditures by
outside groups. And, if legislatures fail to act, we argue that the courts
have sufficient inherent authority to impose those expenditure limits.
Finally, we urge states to adopt public funding systems for judicial
campaigns, and we similarly argue that the need for judicial impartiality
should provide legislatures with sufficient cause to adopt restrictions that
would not be constitutionally acceptable in non-judicial campaigns.13
We are not proposing that states abandon the election of judges when
they choose to do so—that is beyond the scope of this article, and it is an
issue on which the authors hold differing views. But when jurisdictions
give a role to the voters in the selection or retention of judgeships, we
believe that strong protections must be put in place to help ensure the
continued independence and impartiality of the judicial branch.
I.

BACKGROUND: A WINDING ROAD OF CASES

The explosion of cash in judicial elections—and what might be done
about it—must be analyzed in the context of a number of Supreme Court

12

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(B)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2016) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
13
As evident from many of the academic articles cited in this essay as
well as American Bar Association proposals, calls for greater controls on spending in judicial elections are nothing new. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 133 (1998).
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and circuit court cases that can be traced back to Buckley v. Valeo14 in
1976. The Buckley per curiam opinion relied on the First Amendment
and struck down several provisions the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971,15 including caps on spending by campaigns, individuals, and
independent groups in federal elections.16 At the same time, Buckley upheld provisions limiting the size of individual and political committee
contributions to campaigns,17 as well as mandatory campaign disclosures18 and voluntary public funding programs.19 In its opinion, the
Buckley court used a “closely drawn” scrutiny approach.20 Yet the Court
found that annual dollar limits on individual and committee contributions constituted the statute’s “primary weapons against the reality or
appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of
candidates on large campaign contributions”21 and that the contribution
ceilings served “the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights
of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and
discussion.”22 At the same time, the Court found “that the government
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption” were
inadequate to justify the statute’s ceiling on independent expenditures,23
asserting that independent advocacy did not “presently appear to pose
dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified
with large campaign contributions”24 and that the “absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate,
but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”25 The Court
also ruled that no government interest—at least none proposed to it—
was sufficient to justify the restrictions on total campaign expenditures,
and that the contribution caps and disclosure requirements appeared to
be sufficient.26 The Buckley court did not consider the statute’s ban on
corporate independent expenditures. But in 2003, Citizens United v. Fed14

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86
Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101–30146).
16
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–51.
17
Id. at 26–36.
18
Id. at 60–61.
19
Id. at 86.
20
Id. at 25; se also, McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission, 540
U.S. 93, 94 (2003) (Justice Stevens, for the Court, describes Buckley as having
applied a “‘closely drawn’ scrutiny” test.
21
Id. at 58.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 44.
24
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
25
Id. at 47.
26
Id. at 55.
15
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eral Election Commission held that laws burdening political speech
were subject to strict scrutiny28 and that restrictions could not suppress
political speech based on a speaker’s corporate identity, and that “[n]o
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.” 29 More recently, in McCutcheon v.
Federal Election Commission,30 Chief Justice Roberts held for a 5-4 majority that statutory aggregate limits on how much a donor may contribute in total to all political candidates or committees violated the First
Amendment. The aggregate limit also had not been addressed in Buckley
v. Valeo. Roberts wrote that the Court had previously “identified only
one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances:
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”31 He asserted:
“In assessing the First Amendment interests at stake, the proper focus is
on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective
conception of the public good.”32 McCutcheon did not affect individual
contribution limits to a single campaign—just the aggregate cap on all
contributions in a campaign cycle. But Buckley, Citizens United and their
progeny such as McCutcheon, paved the way for the increase in campaign spending nationally, including special interest spending in judicial
elections.33
Other Supreme Court cases have focused on the First Amendment in
the judicial campaign context, including decisions relating to campaigning, fund-raising and expenditures. The campaign practices case that
surprised and perturbed many in the judiciary34 and academia35 was Re-

27

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 340.
29
Id. at 365.
30
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
31
Id. at 1438.
32
Id.
33
See, e.g., Debra Erenberg & Matt Berg, The Dark Night Rises: The
Growing Role of Independent Expenditures in Judicial Elections after Citizens
United, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501 (2013); Norman L. Greene, How Great is
America’s Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into the Supreme Court’s
Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial
Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA.
L. REV. 873 (2010); Nicholas LaRow, Open Floodgates? Independent Spending
in State Supreme Court Elections after Citizens United, 100 JUDICATURE 47
(2016) (demonstrating an immediate increase in expenditures in state supreme
court races after Citizens United). But see Bonneau & Streb, supra note 6, at
260–61, in which the authors conclude that the cost of judicial election campaigns have not increased since White in a statistically significant way.
34
See, e.g., Robert H. Alsdorf, The Sound of Silence: Thoughts of a Sitting Judge on the Problem of Free Speech and the Judiciary in a Democracy, 30
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197 (2003); American Judicature Society, The Legacy of
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Judicial Independence, Judicial Selec28
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36

publican Party of Minnesota v. White in 2002. In White, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion in a 5-4 decision that the Minnesota
Code of Judicial Conduct’s “Announce Clause”37 banning judges and
judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, violated judicial candidates’ First Amendment rights. Scalia
reasoned that announcing one’s views “covers much more than promising to decide an issue a particular way.”38 Applying a strict scrutiny
standard. Scalia concluded that the Announce Clause was not narrowly
tailored to serve impartiality or its appearance, and he narrowed the concept of “impartiality” to bias for or against particular parties to a proceeding—not for or against particular issues.39 Scalia wrote that while
there might be an interest in “impartiality” in the broader sense of lack of
a predisposition on a particular topic, that was not a compelling state interest.40 He noted: “A judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component
of equal justice, and with good reason. For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the

tion, and the First Amendment in the Post-White Era, 91 JUDICATURE 135
(2007).
35
See, e.g., Dale A. Riedel, Losing Faith in the System: Unfettered Political Speech of Judicial Candidates Fails to Assure an Openminded Judiciary
after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421
(2003); Roy A. Schotland, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Should
Judges be More Like Politicians? 41 JUDGES’ J. 7 (2002); Wendy R. Weiser,
Regulating Judges’ Political Activity after White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 651 (2005).
36
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
37
Former Canon 5(A)(3)(d) of the Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct
(2000) provided that a candidate for judicial office must not “announce his or
her views on disputed legal or political issues.” For a detailed discussion of the
history and controversy of Minnesota’s “Announce Clause,” see Plymouth Nelson, Don't Rock the Boat: Minnesota’s Canon 5 Keeps Incumbents High and
Dry While Voters Flounder in a Sea of Ignorance, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1607, 1625–29 (2002). Since the American Bar Association’s promulgation of a
revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 2007, a number of states, including
Minnesota, have revised their codes of judicial conduct. The ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, as well as Minnesota’s, now address campaign activity at
Canon 4. For a brief history of the development of the ABA Model Code in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in White, see STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D.
SIMON, ANDREW M. PERLMAN & JOHN STEELE, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES & STANDARDS 691–94 (2015). For a description of the state-by-state
adoption of the American Bar Association’s 2007 revisions to the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, see State Adoption of Revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct, A.B.A., CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/grou
ps/professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_regulation/map.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/V8DU-LJDY].
38
White, 536 U.S. at 770.
39
Id. at 776.
40
Id. at 777.
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law.” Justice O’Connor, a former state judge, concurred with a glum
assessment that “the very practice of electing judges undermines” the
state interest in an impartial judiciary, noting that “[e]lected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome
of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.”42 Justice
Steven’s dissent vigorously disagreed with the notion that judicial candidates should have the same freedom to express themselves as candidates
for political office,43 and also with the concept of narrowing “impartiality” to a predisposition towards a specific party.44 Justice Ginsburg also
dissented, emphasizing that “judges perform a function fundamentally
different from that of the people’s elected representatives,”45 and that
Minnesota could further “its interest in judicial integrity through this
precisely targeted speech restriction.”46
On the other hand, a majority of the Supreme Court certainly did appear concerned about impartiality of judges when it involved a specific
company’s possible “purchase” of an individual state supreme court
judge when that company had a high stakes case in front of that court.
Seven years after White, the Court in Caperton v. Massey Coal47 held
that gigantic campaign contributions and independent expenditures (almost $3 million) by the chair of Massey Coal to unseat a sitting justice
on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals while Massey Coal was
appealing a $50 million judgment to that court, required the disqualification of the successful candidate backed by Massey Coal. Don Blankenship, chair and CEO of Massey Coal, had contributed the $1,000 statutory maximum to the campaign committee of Brent Benjamin, who was
running to unseat the sitting Justice Warren McGraw.48 But Blankenship
also gave almost $2.5 million to a political organization opposed to
McGraw, and separately spent $500,000 on independent expenditures in
support of the challenger, Benjamin.49 Benjamin was elected, but declined to recuse himself from the appeal in a $50 million commercial
lawsuit against Massey Coal. That case was decided 3-2, and the plaintiff
appealed to the Supreme Court because Benjamin had declined to recuse
himself.50 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted
that an opinion poll indicated that 67% of West Virginians believed that
the newly-elected Justice Benjamin could not be impartial in the case.51

41

Id.
Id. at 788.
43
Id. at 797.
44
Id. at 800.
45
Id. at 803.
46
Id. at 804.
47
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
48
Id. at 873.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 873–76.
51
Id. at 875.
42
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Kennedy emphasized that due process requires a fair tribunal, and concluded that in this “exceptional case” there was “a serious risk of actual
bias . . . when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the
case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when
the case was pending or imminent.53 He ruled that the case must be reversed because of Justice Benjamin’s refusal to recuse himself.54 Chief
Justice Roberts wrote a lively dissent, arguing that the Due Process
Clause does not mandate recusal based on a mere “probability of bias.”55
He concluded that Justice Kennedy had failed to articulate a workable
standard for recusals, and listed 40 “fundamental questions” the majority
opinion had, in his view, failed to address.56
But a year after Caperton, Chief Justice Roberts appeared much
more sympathetic to court controls on judicial candidates. In WilliamsYulee v. the Florida Bar,57 Roberts authored an opinion upholding,
against a First Amendment challenge, a Florida Code of Judicial Conduct rule that prohibited judicial candidates from personally soliciting
funds. Importantly, Roberts wrote an opinion that in marked contrast to
White, emphasized: “A State’s interest in preserving public confidence in
the integrity of its judiciary extends beyond its interest in preventing the
appearance of corruption in legislative and executive elections.58 He noted: 59
“Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the
bench by way of the ballot. And a State’s decision to
elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial
candidates like campaigners for political office. A State
may assure its people that judges will apply the law
without fear or favor—and without having personally
asked anyone for money.”
Roberts then highlighted the importance of Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct in preserving the integrity and independence of the judiciary.60 He pointed out the strong temptations that judges would be faced
when deciding cases in which campaign donors known to them were
lawyers or litigants appearing before them,61 and openly worried that
litigants might believe it necessary to search for attorneys who had made

52

Id. at 876.
Id. at 884.
54
Id. at 889–90.
55
Id. at 890–91.
56
Id. at 893–98.
57
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
58
Id. at 1667.
59
Id. at 1662.
60
Id. at 1662–63, 1666.
61
Id. at 1667.
53
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significant campaign donations to individual judges. Applying a strict
scrutiny test, he concluded that the Code’s restriction on direct solicitation by judicial candidates “advances the State’s compelling interest in
preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary,” and it did
so through “means narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessarily abridging
speech.”63
Williams-Yulee is important because it suggests that Chief Justice
Roberts firmly believes that elected judges are different from elected
politicians, that the First Amendment applies to judges differently than to
other people, and that codes of judicial conduct are legitimate tools to
protect judicial integrity and public confidence in the judiciary. Accordingly, he might be willing to sustain more vigorous state court actions to
preserve their independence though canons that constrain judicial campaign money in ways that would not be acceptable restrictions when applied to legislative or executive elections. As we next discuss, social science research suggests that large donations for and against judicial
candidates appear to have a material effect on both the appearance and
the actuality of an impartial judiciary.
THE IMPACT OF MONEY ON JUDGES’ DECISIONS AND PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF IMPARTIALITY.

II.

A.

Money Appears to Talk . . .

Whether or not the individual judges who receive large campaign
donations are fully conscious of the resulting impact on their decisions,
social scientists have solid evidence that judicial behavior is materially
affected by who is contributing—and by how much. This suggests that
large campaign contributions pose a real danger to an impartial judiciary,
and not just a perceived problem.
Political scientists Chris W. Bonneau of the University of Pittsburgh
and Damon M. Cann of Utah State University have jointly and separately published several papers linking judicial campaign contributions to
how judges rule from the bench. In a 2009 paper, Bonneau and Cann
concluded that campaign contributions appeared to have a particular effect on the outcome of cases in states in which judges are elected in partisan contests.64 Law professors Michael S. Kang and Joanna Shepherd
found in one study an unsurprising relationship between political party
contributions and judicial stance, particularly with respect to Republican
judges.65 In another paper, Kang and Shepherd showed that “the more
62

Id. at 1668.
In concurring opinions, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg rejected the
strict scrutiny test in this context. Id. at 1673–75.
64
Bonneau & Cann, supra note 7, at 19.
65
Kang & Shepherd, supra note 7, at S181; see also Michael S. Kang
& Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of
Campaign contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 103–05
63
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TV ads aired during state supreme court judicial elections in a state, the
less likely justices are to vote in favor of criminal defendants.”66 In an
article focusing on the Georgia Supreme Court, Cann was also able to
correlate campaign contributions with judges’ decisions, a phenomenon
suggesting “that independence of the judiciary may be seriously compromised in states that use competitive elections to select judges.”67
Many studies demonstrate correlation without showing causation,68
and correlations between contributors and judicial decisions can often be
explained by the observation that judicial campaign donors are likely to
direct their money toward candidates whose general views they prefer.
But a 2016 study by a team of political scientists led by St. Louis University’s Morgan Hazelton compared rulings by supreme court justices
in North Carolina who joined a public financing mechanism with those
who did not. They concluded that after opting into public financing, justices “became relatively less favorable toward attorney donors” and that
“the justices who opted into the system become more ideologically moderate relative to nonparticipating justices.”69 This study, with its built-in
control group of justices who continued to rely on private campaign
funding, provides solid evidence that whether or not the judges themselves perceive it, funding sources influence voting patterns on the
bench. Hazelton and her colleagues concluded that “donors do in fact
(2011) (in which the authors demonstrate that competitive elections produce
judges whose opinions are more “pro-business” than judges selected and confirmed through a retention method, and suggest a link between campaign contributions and judicial decision-making.).
66
Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, Television Advertising and State Supreme Court Justices’ Decisions in Criminal Cases, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, 2014, https://skewedjustice.org/
[https://perma.cc/2C2W-9L82].
67
Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial
Decision
Making
(2006),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=991364
[https://perma.cc/FUQ3-ZUCX]. On the other hand, Cann concluded in a 2002
paper that in the 1998 term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, there was no correlation between lawyers’ donations to specific justices and how those jurists
ruled in cases argued by the contributing lawyers. Damon M. Cann, Campaign
Contributions and Judicial Behavior, 23 AM. REV. POL. 261 (2002).
68
A study of state supreme court campaigns from 1993 to 1998, by The
Plain Dealer newspaper in Ohio, concluded that two-thirds of the time the court
ruled in favor of clients represented by the lawyers who contributed the most to
the justices’ campaigns. Charles G. Geyh, Publicly Financing Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2001). Geyh pointed out
that there may be “perfectly innocuous explanations” for the correlation between campaign donations and success. But he noted that even “if the reality of
influence can be rebutted . . . appearance problems remain.” Id.
69
Morgan L. W. Hazelton, Jacob M. Montgomery, & Brendan Nyhan,
Does Public Financing Affect Judicial Behavior? Evidence from the North Carolina Supreme Court, 44 AM. POL. RES. 587, 608 (2016).
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have distorting influence on judicial decision making.” This conclusion
is consistent with similar studies, such as one by Joanna Shepherd, that
concluded that when judges are serving in their last terms prior to mandatory retirement, their voting patterns change and they become much
less business-oriented in their decisions.71
B.

. . . And the Voters are Not the Least Bit Surprised

While there is evidence that campaign contributions affect judges’
impartiality, there is even more evidence that the public believes campaign donations directly influence judicial decision-making. Voters seem
to think this is true even where judges are in fact immune to the subtle
pressures of campaign contributions and the interest groups making
them. James Sample and David Pozen have summarized data suggesting
that more than 70 percent of Americans believe that campaign contributions have some impact on judicial decisions.72 In a 2013 study,73 political scientists James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira found that judges who
turn down contributions are perceived as fairer, and that the public seems
to believe that the size of a campaign contribution makes less difference
than the fact that a judge’s campaign accepts money from an interest
group or litigant at all. The authors suggest that their “most important
findings are that campaign contributions and support can indeed create
perceptions of conflicts of interest and thereby weaken the legitimacy of
state courts”74 and that in “a post-Citizens United world, these findings . .
. point to significant threats to the legitimacy of elected state courts.”75 A
2011 poll of North Carolina voters by the advocacy group Justice at
Stake, found that 83% of those questioned thought that campaign contributions either greatly (43%) or somewhat (40%) influence the rulings
judges make.76
70

Id. at 608–09.
Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’
Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 190 (2009).
72
James Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More
Rigorous, 46 JUDGES’ J. 17 (2007).
73
Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8.
74
Id. at 78.
75
Id. at 76. One of the most interesting findings by Gibson and Caldeira is that “about one-third of the American people . . . accept a fairly politicized
judiciary” and that this represents “a card-core minority of Americans who are
unfazed by possible conflicts of interest.” Id. at 96.
76
North Carolina Registered Voter Survey Ref. 2011-165, 20/20 InAT
STAKE
sight,
LLC,
JUSTICE
(2011), http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/cms/q165__freq_limited_r
elease_9E72F4684EB8B.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FED-S542]. A similar 2010 poll
in West Virginia yielded similar results. Anzalone Liszt Research, Inc., Justice
AT
at
Stake-West
Virginia
2010,JUSTICE
STAKE (2010), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/West_Virginia_Poll_R
esults_674E634FDB13F.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X5L-AMT7].
71
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The bottom line is that impartiality, and the appearance of impartiality, are distinct phenomena—both important to a functioning independent
judiciary. And both are directly affected by judicial campaign contributions. So next we turn to what the states and the state courts are (or are
not) doing about it.
WHAT STATES ARE (AND AREN’T) DOING ABOUT JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES.

III.

States in which voters play a role in selecting or retaining judges
vary significantly in whether and how they address the level of money
directed at the judicial selection process. Many states (but by no means
all) have statutes limiting individual and corporate donations to judicial
campaigns. The American Bar Association has not succeeded in its attempt to have contribution caps inserted in codes of judicial conduct, but
many judicial conduct codes do include disqualification language with
alternate approaches to addressing bias or perceived bias in cases involving large contributors. Tight recusal or disqualification77 rules are one
path. And a few jurisdictions have public financing for judgeship elections. Because of Buckley v. Valeo,78 the states currently are not attempting mandatory caps on total expenditures by judicial candidate’s campaign committees or by independent groups. This section discusses the
status of these various methods of reducing campaign donations that affect the independence of judges and how the public views that independence.

77

Historically, the term “recusal” was used to connote a judge’s voluntary decision to stand down from a case, while “disqualification” was mandatory. However, the leading treatise on the topic concludes that the terms are used
interchangeably today and are frequently seen as being synonymous. RICHARD
E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES 3–4 (2d ed. 2007).
78
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Statutory Limits on Individual and Organizational Contributions

Statutory caps on donations to judicial elections not only vary from
state to state, but within states based on whether the position is statewide
or local, appellate or trial court, or a specialty court such as the probate
or family bench. One can appreciate the variety by reviewing the statutory restrictions on contributions to supreme court races. Based on a review of official websites and statutes79 for the 37 states where voters
play a role in selecting supreme court justices,80 as of 2017, individuals
in three states are restricted to campaign donations of $1,000 or less per
campaign per election cycle, individuals in seven states may contribute
amounts more than $1,000 but less than $5,000, individuals in 17 states
are subject to contribution limits above $5,000, and in 10 states there are
no individual contribution limits at all. This is summarized on the following table:
TABLE 1
STATE LIMITS ON STATE SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
BY INDIVIDUALS DURING AN ELECTION CYCLE
Up to $1,000
AK,MT, WV

> $1,000 but
< $5,000
CO*,
KY,
MN, SD, TN,
WA, WY

$5,000 +

No limits

AZ, AR, FL,
AL, CA, IN,
GA, ID, IL, LA, IA, KS, NE,*
MI, MS, MO, ND, OR, PA, UT
NV, NM, NC,
OH, OK, TX, WI
* Colorado’s Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 4.2 and 4.3, and Nebraska’s
Court Rule §5-3-4.4, ban any judicial campaign activity unless a judge encounters “active opposition” in a retention election, and then statutory statewide candidate contribution rules apply.

The size of the states’ individual campaign contribution limits does
not appear to correlate to whether those states select justices through par79

The authors reviewed official state campaign disclosure websites and
statutes for each state at the time of the article’s publishing. A website with
summary
data
that
is
not
up
to
date)
is
Ballotpedia,
https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_elections [https://perma.cc/RT8U-XVKQ] (then,
for each state, choose the state and then click on “Campaign Finance Requirements for [name of state] Judicial Elections.”). Also see the out-of-date website
originally compiled by the American Judicature Society, and now available
through
the
National
Center
for
State
Courts, at: http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_el
ections/campaign_financing.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/7BYY-V7VZ].
80
Although some of these states provide for the election of some lower
court judges, members of the supreme courts in the following thirteen states are
appointed by governors and/or legislatures, with no role for the voters: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia.
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tisan elections, non-partisan elections, or some type of appointment-plusretention system. It is likely that the limit amounts are driven by local
history, custom, and political factors.
Statutory limits on supreme court campaign contributions by organizations is more complicated because many states have different limits, or
contribution prohibitions, with respect to political action committees,
political parties, corporations,81 unions, and other entities. However,
lumping all types of organizations together, a general picture of the distribution of state limits on entity contributions to judicial campaigns
emerges:
TABLE 2
STATE LIMITS ON STATE SUPREME CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
BY ORGANIZATIONS DURING AN ELECTION CYCLE
Up to $1,000
AK*, AZ*,
MS, MT*, WV*

> $1,000 but
< $5,000
CO*, KY*,
MN*, SD, WA,
WY*

$5,000 +

No limits

AR*,
FL,
AL,
CA,
GA, ID, IN, IL, IA*, KS, NE,
LA, MI*, MO*, ND*, OR, PA*,
NM, NV, NC*, UT
OH, OK, TN,
TX,* WI*
* Applies to certain campaign committees and/or PACs, but corporations
prohibited from contributing directly to campaigns. See Table 1 note regarding
Colorado and Nebraska.

There are only modest differences between the donation limits for
individuals and for organizations. It should be noted that slightly more
states put organizations in the lowest limit category than those states do
for individual donors. Fewer states appear in the second category of donation amounts. Fewer states allow organizations to make unlimited contributions, although some states permit very large organizational donations—up to $55,400 for PACs in Illinois, and $537,100 for political
parties in Ohio.
Similar to individual contribution limits, there does not appear to be
an immediately apparent correlation between maximum limits and the
method of supreme court selection. However, notwithstanding the state81

Although statutes in a number of states purport to ban corporate contributions, in many jurisdictions corporations may contribute indirectly through
committees or PACs. Further, bans on corporate political contributions are subject to attack on both equal protection and free speech grounds, particularly
since Citizens United. In Protect My Check v. Dilger, 176 F. Supp. 3d 685, 704
(E.D. Ky. 2016), a federal district court ruled, on equal protection grounds, that
a ban on corporate contributions to political campaigns of all types was unconstitutional to the extent that the ban on corporate contributions did not apply
equally to unions and LLCs. See also, Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo.
2010); In re Interrogatories of Ritter, 227 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2010).
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by-state limits, a detailed 2013 study by Joanna Shepherd concluded that
total business contributions were much higher in states with elections,
and especially in those with partisan elections.82 For both individual and
organization contributions, limits are irrelevant for those states that have
no campaigns for supreme court because the voters play no role whatsoever in the selection or retention process. But for those states with judicial selection or retention elections, it is significant that statutes in 19
states allow organizations—especially PACs—to contribute $5,000 or
more to supreme court campaign committees, and 22 states permit individuals (often lawyers) to contribute $5,000 or more. Those numbers
represent a majority of states that include the voters in determining who
serves on their highest appellate bench. And the three states that allow
the largest contributions from organizations—Illinois, Texas, and Ohio—
all use partisan elections for the initial selection of their supreme court
justices. Contributions of $5,000 are readily noticed by judicial candidates.
Most codes of judicial conduct follow the ABA model rule prohibiting them from personally soliciting or accepting campaign contributions.83 However, as former candidates for supreme court positions, the
authors are both familiar with the fund raising process.84 Our experience
is that while justices might not know precisely who has contributed to
their campaign committees, or how much, it is difficult to avoid knowing, from public endorsements and from attendance at fund raisers
(which the candidates politely leave before money is requested), the
types of lawyers and interest groups that seem ready to help out.85

82

Joanna Shepherd, Justice at Risk: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 10–11 (June
2013),
http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_1
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFZ3-4JQ2].
83
MODEL CODE R. 4.1(A)(8).
84
Author Philip A. Talmadge was elected to the Washington State Supreme Court in 1994, serving from 1995-2001. Hugh D. Spitzer was an unsuccessful candidate for the Washington State Supreme Court in 1998.
85
The practical difficulty of shielding judicial candidates from the
identities of their contributors is discussed in FLAMM, supra note 77, at 154–57.
Flamm points out that by attending fundraisers, a judicial candidate “cannot
help but learn the identity of the contributors” and that because candidates often
must sign campaign disclosure documents as to their accuracy, “the ethical provisions designed to screen judges from their contributors are, as a practical matter, unenforceable.” Id., at 190. Indeed, as the authors are aware from their respective judicial campaigns, Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.1(A)(7)
prohibits judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds, and
most candidates leave the room when solicitations are made and conscientiously
avoid learning the identity of contributors. Yet state elections law requires the
candidates to certify disclosure information to state election authorities, including the identities of in-kind contributors, pledges, and corrections in the identi-
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The ABA’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Limit Contributions Through
Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.4(B)(1)

In 1998, the American Bar Association’s Task Force on Lawyers’
Political Contributions recommended, among other things, that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct be amended to limit the amount of money
that a judicial candidate’s committee could accept from any specific
lawyer, firm, or organization.86 The following year, the ABA House of
Delegates amended the Model Code to add a provision establishing capping both individual and entity campaign contributions at amounts to be
determined on a state-by-state basis.87 The 2007 revision to the Model
Code placed these recommended limits at Rule 4.4((B)(1), which currently reads:
(B) A judicial candidate subject to public election shall
direct his or her campaign committee:
(1) to solicit and accept only such campaign
contributions* as are reasonable, in any event
not to exceed, in the aggregate,* $[insert
amount] from any individual or $[insert amount]
from any entity or organization;
The concept is for each state adopting the Model Code to consider inclusion of aggregate limits from individuals and organizations that are seen
by the rule promulgators as being “reasonable in amount, appropriate
under the circumstances, and in conformity with applicable law.”88 A
similar Model Code provision, at Rule 2.11(A)(4), would require the
disqualification of judges where a party or lawyer appearing before that
judge has made aggregate campaign contributions of a specified amount
within a specified time period.89

ties of contributors or amounts donated. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-16-041
(2017).
86
GILLERS ET AL., supra note 37, at 690.
87
Former MODEL CODE R. 5(C)(3). The 1999 amendments are available
at
Model
Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 5, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/group
s/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct/mo
del_code_of_judicial_conduct_canon_5.html [https://perma.cc/T6NS-FNHV].
88
MODEL CODE R. 4.4(C)(3). The 2007 adjustments to the rule also
added language to that comment to the effect that a candidate “should be especially cautious in connection with such contributions, so they do not create
grounds for disqualification if the candidate is elected to judicial office.”
CHARLES G. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE ABA
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 113 (2008).
89
MODEL CODE R. 2.11(A)(4) states that a judge must disqualify himself or herself when his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including when: “(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that
a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the pre-

2018]

Judicial Campaigns

105

But the ABA’s attempt to promote contribution limits in codes of judicial conduct has been markedly unsuccessful. Although 35 states have
codes of judicial conduct that reflect many of the ABA’s recommended
2007 revisions,90 none have in place Rule 4.4((B)(1) language that tracks
the ABA’s recommended provision. Many either have not adopted Rule
4.4,91 or have adopted and shortened Rule 4.4(B)(1) so that it admonishes judicial campaign committees to “to solicit and accept only such campaign contributions as are reasonable,”92 or, in eleven states,93 to accept
contributions that do not exceed those permitted by law. Only Ohio’s
Rule 4.4(H)94 details the maximum amounts that campaign committees
may accept for various judicial offices, and for the state supreme court
the limits are relatively high: $7,600 for full election cycle from individuals, $14,000 from organizations, and $537,100 from political parties.
Michigan, which has not updated its code of judicial conduct, includes
only one prescribed limit: its Canon 7(B)(2)(C) bans judicial campaign
committees from soliciting more than $100 from any attorney.95
Minnesota experimented with Rule 4.4(B)(1), adopting in 2008 a
version requiring judicial campaign committees “to solicit and accept
only campaign contributions not to exceed, in the aggregate, $2,000
from any individual, entity, or organization in an election year and $500
in a non-election year.”96 That rule was repealed five years later97 after
vious [insert number] year[s] made aggregate* contributions* to the judge’s
campaign in an amount that [is greater than $[insert amount] for an individual or
$[insert amount] for an entity] [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual
or an entity].”
90
See State Adoption of Revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
A.B.A.
(2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/judici
al_ethics_regulation/map.html [https://perma.cc/GA77-MKBZ].
91
Id.
92
See, e.g., INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2011);
MAINE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2015); NEBRASKA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2011).
93
See, e.g., ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2017);
IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2017); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2010); KANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2009);
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2016); MONTANA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2014); NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4
(2009); OKLAHOMA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2010); PENNSYLVANIA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2014); TENNESSEE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2017); WASHINGTON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4
(2011).
94
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(H) (2017).
95
MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 7(B)(2)(C) (2016).
96
ORDER PROMULGATING REVISED MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, ADM08-8004 (Dec. 18, 2008).
97
ORDER PROMULGATING AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ADM08-8004 (Dec. 31, 2013).
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the Minnesota legislature amended its campaign finance law to cover
judicial elections.98 Justice Barry Anderson dissented from the original
order on the grounds that the state’s Board of Judicial Standards, as a
judicial ethics board, was ill-equipped to supervise and enforce the rule
as a type of campaign finance regulatory agency.99 He suggested that
Minnesota’s Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board would be a
better agency to manage judicial campaign contribution limits.100 Justice
Anderson’s view ultimately prevailed, and soon after the legislature
brought judicial campaign contributions under the general statute, the
Minnesota Supreme Court amended its Rule 4.4(b)(1) so that it now required judicial candidates to direct their campaign committees “to solicit
and accept only campaign contributions in an amount allowed by
law.”101
It is hard to know why Model Code Rule 4.4(B)(1) has been so unsuccessful. Justice Anderson’s reticence about the judiciary overseeing
campaign practices is a reasonable explanation—at least in those states
where statutes do set limits on contributions to judicial campaigns.
Where the only rule requirement is that judicial campaign committees
must solicit accept only such contributions as are “reasonable,” that reasonableness standard is largely incapable of enforcement. Precisely how
large a contribution is “unreasonable?” Does it make a difference if the
candidate is an incumbent who has the benefit of some name familiarity?
Does it make a difference if the candidate is facing a well-financed opponent or large independently-financed attack ads? One can also speculate that because the proposed Rule 4.4(B)(1) does not control independent expenditures, some justices may wish to keep their powder dry and
maintain the ability of their committees to raise substantial amounts of
cash if those justices are targeted by well-funded independent groups.
These practical concerns are real in the rough and tumble world of campaigns.
C.

Tighter Disqualification Rules

Some concerned about the impact of large campaign contributions
on judicial impartiality (and the appearance of impartiality) advocate for
stiffer mandatory disqualification rules. The Gibson and Caldeira study,

98

Act of May 24, 2013, ch. 138, 2013 Minn. Laws 2353.
ORDER PROMULGATING AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ADM08-8004, supra note 97, at D-1.
100
Id. Before joining the court, Justice Anderson had served on Minnesota’s Ethical Practices Board, the predecessor agency of the Campaign Finance
and Public Disclosure Board. Telephone Interview with Justice Barry Anderson,
Minnesota Supreme Court (Jan. 30, 2017).
101
ORDER PROMULGATING AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ADM08-8004, supra note 97.
99
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discussed above, concluded that the impact of large contributions on
the perceived legitimacy of the courts was mitigated, but not entirely
cured, by strong recusal requirements.103 A recent study by political scientists Banks Miller and Brett Curry104 focused on the impact of a mandatory disqualification statute in Alabama.105 Miller and Curry concluded
that the law “played a role in reducing the number of large donations
from attorneys, business, and parties,”106 but that one response to the
requirement was simply to shift money from individuals to PACs so that
“donations do not count against the contribution limit, triggering
recusal.”107
In Model Code Rule 2.11(A)(4),108 the ABA has recommended that a
“judge must disqualify himself or herself when his or her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned,” including when a party or lawyer has
contributed more than an amount to be specified in the rule. However, in
a phenomenon similar to the fate of Model Rule 4.4(B)(1), the ABA’s
approach to mandatory disqualification has almost completely ignored.
Again, practical problems intrude. How large a contribution would result
in a judge’s impartiality being questioned? Is it measured based on the
percentage of all contributions to the judge’s campaign, or by a hard dollar amount? Based on two national surveys,109 it appears that only Arizo-

102

See Gibson & Caldeira, supra notes 8, 74, 75 and accompanying

text.
103

See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8, at 78.
Banks Miller & Brett Curry, The Effect of Per Se Recusal Rules on
Donor Behavior in Judicial Elections, 24 JUSTICE SYS. J. 125 (2013).
105
The statute relevant to the Miller and Curry study, ALA. CODE § 1224-2, was adopted in 1995 and required supreme court justices to recuse if a
party or lawyer before them had contributed more than $4,000 during the previous election cycle. See ALA. CODE § 12-24-2(c). That statute was repealed in
2014 by Act 2014-455, p. 1688, § 2, after something of a stalemate between the
state’s Attorney General and the State Supreme Court over enforcement. See
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS
(Nov.
2016), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judici
al%20Ethics/Disqualificationcontributions.ashx
[https://perma.cc/HU3W79ME]. The statute was then replaced by Ala. Laws 2014-455, codified at ALA.
CODE § 12-24-3. Id. at 2–3. The new approach created a rebuttable presumption
that the justice or judge should recuse if a contribution during the previous election cycle exceeded a specified percentage of all contributions to that jurist’s
campaign, provided for an appeal if a judge did not recuse.
106
See Miller & Curry, supra note 104, at 101.
107
See id. at 102.
108
See supra note 89.
109
A.B.A. CPR Pol’y Implementation Comm., Comparison of ABA
Model Judicial Code and State Variations, Rule 2.11: Disqualification, (Aug.
31,
2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_respo
104
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na and Utah have adopted Model Code Rule 2.11(A)(4) in a form close
to that suggested by the ABA, and only four other states (Alabama, California, Mississippi and New York) have adopted differently worded rules
mandating recusal when campaign contributions from a party or lawyer
exceed a specific amount. Based on the same surveys, it seems that every
other state has either done nothing, or adopted Model Code Rule 2.11
while deleting Rule 2.11(A)(4), or, in the case of 11 states identified in
the National Center for State Courts’ study,110 “adopted new disqualification rules that do not have specific triggers like the ABA model, but that
expressly or impliedly incorporate the decision in Caperton.”111 Those
new rules tend to be fairly general and permissive in character, not at all
like the mandatory disqualification approach recommended in Model
Code Rule 2.11(A)(4).
Law professors Deborah Goldberg, James Sample and David Pozen
have reviewed the nation’s experience with courts underusing and underenforcing recusals,112 and recommended a number of potential reforms including per se disqualification based on high campaign contributions.113 They suggest that the lack of adoption of such a rule can be
explained by (1) the fact that the rule is unnecessary in states where statutes have already capped donations to all political campaigns,114 and (2)
the likelihood that parties might try to disqualify a judge by intentionally
contributing to his or her campaign committee.115 Their solution is a rule
that would aggregate contributions not just from a single donor but from
all donors associated with a party to a legal action. They would also
permit a party to waive disqualification.116 But given the low interest of
courts in adopting any contribution caps, it is unlikely that these recommendations would be adopted. Goldberg, Sample and Pozen recommend
several other approaches, including, among others, peremptory disqualifications, independent determinations on disqualification motions, and
improved mechanisms for replacing disqualified appellate judges.117

nsibility/2_11.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/M27J-B2D2]; JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 105.
110
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS,
supra note 105, at 4–10, identifies Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Georgia, Missouri,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington.
111
Id. at 4.
112
Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L. J.
503, 524 (2007).
113
Id. at 528.
114
See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text, regarding Minnesota’s repeal of a rule based on MODEL CODE R. 2.11(A)(4) after the legislature
expanded that state’s campaign finance law to encompass the judiciary.
115
Goldberg et al., supra note 112, at 529.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 526, 530, and 532; see also Sample & Pozen, supra note 72.
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Perhaps the best explanation for the resistance of courts to impose
tough disqualification rules on themselves is that judges seem to think—
rightly or wrongly—that they can resist pressures and preconceptions
and remain impartial most of the time. With respect to political pressures
and campaign contributions, this is borne out by a study on disqualifications by the American judicature Society, which showed that compared
to other bases for disqualification, relatively few judges saw “political
reasons” and campaign donations as posing difficult disqualification
choices.118 As a state supreme court justice remarked to one of this essay’s authors, many judges reject tight recusal mandates based on political contributions because they feel that a rule like this “suggests that
people thought they could be bought.”119
D.

Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns

Still another proposed solution to the influx of special interest money in judicial election campaigns is to shift to public funding for those
candidates who agree to tight spending limits. A number of public financing approaches have been proposed, including offering refunds or
tax credits to contributors, matching private donations to campaigns, free
television time on public channels like C-SPAN, added space in official
voter pamphlets, and providing grants to candidates once they raise a
minimum amount in small private donations.120 The argument for this
approach is that, if funded generously enough, it can detach judicial candidates from their reliance on special interest groups and allow them to
compete even when their opponents are receiving large donations or independent expenditures. But for those who wish to discourage contested
judicial elections, a downside of a robust public funding program is that
that the availability of funds might encourage challengers.121 On the other hand, this assistance would be available to challengers, too, counteracting the argument that judicial campaign limits are protective of incumbents.
Whatever the pros and cons of public financing of judicial campaigns, this approach to the influence of big money has not taken off—
indeed, only 13 states have some type of public funding for non-judicial
118

JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND
ATTITUDES 54–58 (1995).
119
Telephone Interview with Justice Charles Wiggins, Washington
State Supreme Court (Feb. 24, 2017). For a lively debate about recusal and
judges’ attitudes and resistance to mandatory disqualification, see Charles Geyh,
Myles Lynk, Robert S. Peck & Toni Clarke, The State of Recusal Reform, 18
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 515 (2015).
120
Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles
of Judges and the Rules of Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 104–05
(2003).
121
Id. at 109.
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122

races, and only four have attempted this mechanism in court campaigns. Wisconsin’s program, begun in 1977,123 was first under-funded
and then entirely defunded in Governor Scott Walker’s 2011 budget.124
Notwithstanding the evidence that North Carolina’s public financing
program changed judges’ behavior on the bench and made them less favorable to attorney donors,125 that state’s legislature demolished that
state’s popular system in 2013.126
Today, only New Mexico and West Virginia have public financing in
place for supreme court candidates.127 West Virginia’s program went into
effect after the Massey Coal contributions to a state judicial campaign
first came to light,128 and it provides up to a $525,000s in public support
for candidates who raise a sufficient number of contributions under
$250.129 But the existence of public money for judicial candidates campaign committees has apparently done little to stem to the flow of large

122

Overview of State Laws on Public Financing, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST.
CTS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financingof-campaigns-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/XA4E-HXRU].
123
Bill 664, 1977 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1977).
124
Bill Leuders, Public Financing of Elections a State Budget Casualty, WIS. ST. J., (July 4, 2011), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-andpolitics/elections/public-financing-of-elections-a-state-budgetcasualty/article_3dfcc38a-a63f-11e0-ad5d-001cc4c03
286.html [https://perma.cc/3DQH-MUHK].
125
See Hazelton et al., supra note 69 at 590.
126
Although 77 percent of judicial candidates in contested races used
North Carolina’s public financing system between 2004 and 2010, the state’s
legislature repealed the program in 2013. Adam Smith, North Carolina Legislature Repeals Popular ‘Voter Owned Elections’ Program, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-smith/nc-campaignfinance_b_3660472.html [https://perma.cc/8NMJ-XT2F] (last updated Sept. 25,
2013).
127
Overview of State Laws, supra note 122.
128
Alex Kotch, Outside Money Wins Big in West Virginia Supreme
SOUTH
(May
13,
2016),
Court
Election,
FACING
https://www.facingsouth.org/2016/05/outside-money-wins-big-in-west-virginiasupreme-co [https://perma.cc/UB8D-X2TB]. Kotch’s article observes an irony
of West Virginia’s 2016 election: Justice Brent Benjamin, who had declined to
recuse himself in Caperton, availed himself of that state’s public campaign financing system in his reelection bid, but was defeated by a candidate who benefited from $3 million in spending by outside groups.
129
W. VA. CODE § 3-12-11 (2016). The part of West Virginia’s judicial
campaign public financing tied to amounts raised by opponents was ruled unconstitutional in State ex rel Loughry v. Tennant, 229 W.Va. 630, 632 (2012)
(citing Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Pac v. Bennet, 563 U.S. 721,
755 (2011)). The legislature then approved a version omitting the “matching
fund trigger” component. House Bill 2805, 2013(RS), W. Va. Reg. Sess. (W.
Va. 2013).
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independent expenditures in that state’s judicial elections. New Mexico’s program began in 2007,131 and it was updated in 2013, which witnessed the first appellate judge elected with his campaign almost entirely
financed with public funding.132 But that state’s public funding program
is facing budget challenges, and it remains to be seen if it will be successful on a long term basis.133
Finally, one of the most promising types of public campaign funding
mechanisms—increased public money for candidates facing attacks from
large independent expenditures—was ruled unconstitutional in Arizona
Free Enterprise v. Bennett,134 a case involving public financing of executive and legislative races in Arizona. In Arizona Free Enterprise, Chief
Justice Roberts held for a 5-4 majority that the increased public funds to
match outside expenditures violated the First Amendment because it
could result in the suppression of expenditures by those outside groups135
(which is of course the whole point).136
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Kotch, supra note 128. Because independent expenditures dwarfed
state funding in West Virginia’s 2016 judicial campaign, several of that state’s
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In summary, the small number of states participating in public financing of judicial campaigns, and the ups and downs of funding for
those programs, suggests that the success of this approach is yet to be
determined. But Morgan Hazelton’s recent North Carolina study137 suggests that public funding makes a difference in how judges vote in specific cases, reducing their proclivity to side with donating attorneys and
moving them to more ideologically moderate stances in their opinions.
IV.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

In this section we, suggest an array of actions that state courts and
legislatures can take if they are serious about spending controls in
judicial elections. As noted above, not all judges are willing to get tough
on this issue138 or on the issue of mandatory disqualification from cases
involving major donors.139 But if jurists and legislators are serious about
reducing the influx of money into judicial elections, there definitely are
things they can do about it. Exercising their inherent judicial powers,
courts can establish both tight campaign contribution limits and
corresponding mandatory disqualification requirements. Below, we also
present an argument for the constitutionality of state legislation
controlling campaign expenditures and independent expenditures in the
narrow area of judicial elections. Finally, states can establish public
campaign funding systems for court races.
Two of our recommendations are based on the widely-recognized
power of the courts—typically the supreme courts--to regulate the
judicial branch,140 particularly where necessary to preserve the integrity
and independence of the judiciary and to protect public confidence in the
administration of justice.141 This includes the authority to “regulate
election activities of its members and potential members”142 and to
require recusal when the probability of bias is too high.143 As discussed
below, our other two recommendations require legislative action because

http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-seattle-vouchers-2017-story.html
[https://perma.cc/JGU3-HDG7].
137
See Hazelton et al., supra note 69 at 590 and accompanying text.
138
See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
139
See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
140
In re Petition of Judicial Conduct Comm., 151 N.H. 123, 126 (2004)
(holding that the state supreme court has the power “to control its proceedings,
the conduct of participants, the actions of officers of the court…[as] a power
absolutely necessary for a court to function.”); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338,
346 (Me. 2003) (holding that the supreme judicial court has “inherent authority
to discipline and sanction judges…grounded upon the fundamental need for an
independent judiciary.”).
141
In re Complaint Against Linder, 271 Neb. 323, 330–31 (2006)
142
In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548, 558 (1990).
143
Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 365 Mont. 92, 103 (2012).
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they involve controls over persons outside the control of the judicial
branch.
A.

Using the Code of Judicial Conduct to Install Contribution
Limits

In states where a supreme court concludes that the statutory
framework does not adequately limit donations to judicial campaigns, we
recommend that state supreme courts should act forcefully to impose
strict caps on contributions to judicial campaigns, using the mechanism
suggested by the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, Rule 4.4(B)(1). We suggest a cap of $2,000 per individual or
organizational contributor per election cycle. We see this as an amount
that is a reasonable compromise among the variety of levels set by states
that have any limits at all. As described above,144 of the 37 states where
voters play a role in selecting supreme court justices, three states cap
individual contributions at $1,000, and another seven allow contributions
between $1,000 and $5,000. Five states have set a $1,000 maximum for
entity contributions, and six between $1,000 and $5,000. 10 states have
no individual contribution maximum at all, and another 17 states cap
donations at $5,000 or higher. The lack of relatively tight contribution
limits means that those latter states are more susceptible to an influx of
campaign cash, and according to the political scientists this can affect
both impartiality and the appearance of fair courts.
Many justices might dislike a $2,000 maximum because it means
that they, along with their campaign committees, will be forced to work
much harder to collect a large number of small donations rather than a
small number of big donations. But that’s the point. If it is harder to raise
campaign cash, then less cash will be spent by campaigns. Justices might
also be concerned that these caps could put them at a disadvantage in the
face of large independent expenditures for an opponent or a swarm of
attack ads. Below, we suggest a solution to that problem, i.e., by
legislative limits on independent expenditures in judicial races (and only
in judicial races). Justices like Minnesota’s Barry Anderson145 have a
legitimate argument that courts are not as institutionally qualified as
election commissions to collect campaign data and oversee donations.
But if the legislators refuse to cap campaign contributions to judicial
campaigns, or if those caps are too high (i.e., above $2,000 in our view),
then the courts need to step up and do the job. That job will be easier by
virtue of the fact that most of the states with no contribution limits do
have mandatory campaign reporting systems in place, so that court
administrators (and candidates’ campaigns) can quickly identify
instances of donations exceeding the limits imposed by that state’s Rule
4.4(B)(1).
144
145

See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
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We also recommend that courts expressly bring under the control of
Rule 4.4(B)(1), those outside expenditures that are prearranged or
coordinated with judicial campaigns—this appears to be acceptable
under Buckley v. Valeo.146 So long as the expenditures are not fully
independent, they are appropriately treated as part of the campaigns so
that those expenditures can be limited to $2,000.
B.

Corresponding Mandatory Disqualification Rules

As a companion to campaign contribution limits, state supreme
courts should adopt the mandatory disqualification mechanism in the
ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11(A).147 Our
recommendation is that disqualification should be required where an
attorney or party before a judge has contributed more than $2,000 to that
jurist’s (or an opponent’s) election campaign during the preceding
election cycle. In jurisdictions in which a supreme court or the
legislature has capped contributions at $2,000, the disqualification
requirement will rarely be needed, and will simply serve as a double
protection against oversized contributions. But in states with higher
contribution limits or none at all, the disqualification requirement will
provide an important check on campaign spending—and an effective
one, according to researchers.148
At the same time, mandatory disqualification could cause a shift of
donations from candidates’ campaigns to independent PACs that launch
attacks against a candidate.149 Consequently, we urge state supreme
courts to broaden Rule 2.11(A) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to
include independent expenditures. That rule could require
disqualification of a judge when there is verifiable information150 that a
party before her has contributed more than $2,000 to an independent
entity that paid for advertisements supporting or attacking her during the
previous election cycle. We considered a recommendation that judges
recuse themselves on issues on which independent organizations spent
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424 U.S. at 47; see also accompanying text supra note 25.
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See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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One of the challenges of tracking independent expenditures is that
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candidate. See Tim Cullen, Judicial Campaign Finance: Can the Independence,
Integrity, and Impartiality of the Judiciary Survive Unlimited Stealth PAC Expenditures in Judicial Elections? 51-WTR ARK. LAW. 20, 21–22 (2016), which
observes that if Massey Coal CEO Don Blankenship had contributed to a
501(c)(4) organization rather than to “527” group (an organization described in
28 U.S.C. §527), no one would have known about his donation because 527
organizations are not required to publicly disclose their donors.
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substantial amounts attacking or supporting those judges. But such a rule
would be difficult to implement, and in any event, we believe that it is
legitimate to support or oppose judicial candidates based on their legal
philosophy or broad approach to legal issues. For example, if an
independent group were to spend $100,000 criticizing a judge during a
campaign for being unfairly harsh on criminal defendants, it would not
make sense for that judge, upon reelection, to be required to recuse
himself from every criminal case. Other provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, such as Rule 2.2, can be relied upon to ensure that the
judge continues to be impartial and fair. But there are other methods,
which we next discuss, that can provide tighter controls on independent
expenditures in court races.
C.

Bucking Buckley: Limits on Judicial Campaign and Independent
Expenditures

The key to controlling the level of spending in judicial campaigns is
a mechanism limiting independent expenditures as well as total spending
by campaigns. Yet both of these were ruled out in Buckley v. Valeo,151 at
least for political races. Buckley applied a “closely drawn” test for limits
on campaign speech,152 and that has since evolved towards standard
“strict scrutiny” approach in cases like White153 and McCutcheon.154
However, we contend that judicial elections present a special circumstance that justify greater restrictions than are permitted in campaigns for
policy-making positions, and that even the strict scrutiny standard can be
satisfied. It is important to note that the Buckley decision concluded that
independent campaign expenditures did not “presently appear to pose
dangers of real or apparent corruption. . . .”155 Perhaps that was the case
in 1976, but the research shows that those expenditures do pose real
dangers today in the judicial election context. Based on the Supreme
Court’s willingness in Caperton and Williams-Yulee to go to greater
lengths to protect judicial impartiality and public confidence in the fairness of the courts,156 we suggest that a strong case can be made that a
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compelling interest exists for greater restrictions on expenditures (“financial speech”) in judicial campaigns. Our view is supported by recent
circuit court opinions sustaining various restrictions on judicial candidates.157
First, it should be emphasized that because of society’s interest in
protecting the integrity of the judiciary and public confidence in the
courts, judges are universally expected to give up certain rights that are
possessed by others in the community. For example, while most
individuals can speak out publicly about others’ race, religion or national
origin (including quite outrageous things), judges are almost entirely
constrained in this respect.158 Ordinary citizens have a right to be rude,
but judges must “be patient, dignified, and courteous.”159 Jurists are
limited in their ex parte communications with litigants and lawyers.160
When disciplining trial court Judge Wilbur Malthesius for publicly
criticizing other judges and inappropriately authoring a letter to the local
newspaper, New Jersey’s Supreme Court stated:161
In accepting that appointment, New Jersey judges also
accept restrictions on personal conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. Some of these
restrictions are of constitutional dimension. . . . Some of
those restrictions may otherwise abridge a private
person’s free speech rights. But, by his own choice,
Judge Mathesius is not a private person. He is a judge.
tions differently than political races, is discussed in Charles G. Geyh, The Jekyll
and Hyde of First Amendment Limits on the Regulation of Judicial Campaign
Speech, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 83 (2015). See also Stephen J. Ware, Judicial Elections, Judicial Impartiality and Legitimate Judicial Lawmaking: Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 59, 81 (2015),
which makes some of the same recommendations as this essay.
157
See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1021–32 (8th Cir. 2012)
(finding a compelling state interest and upholding Minnesota’s Code of Judicial
Conduct restrictions on judicial candidate’s endorsements of political candidates
and on personal solicitation of campaign donations); Siefert v. Alexander, 608
F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding Wisconsin’s restrictions on judicial candidates’ party affiliation and recusal rules under strict scrutiny test); Bauer v.
Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding Indiana court rules banning
personal solicitation, candidate commitments on future ruling, and a recusal
rule). But see Wolfson v. Concannon, 750 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversed en
banc) (finding, prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Williams-Yulee, that Arizona’s personal solicitation rule violated the First Amendment, at least with respect to non-judge candidates in judicial elections).
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See, e.g., MODEL CODE, R. 2.3(B) and (C).
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160
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161
In re Malthesius, 188 N.J. 496, 522–23 (2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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In suspending Judge Solomon Osborne for making racist remarks in
public, Mississippi’s Supreme Court wrote:162
No one is compelled to serve as a judge, but once an
individual offers himself or herself for service, that
individual accepts the calling with full knowledge of
certain limitations upon speech and actions in order to
serve the greater good. A calling to public service is not
without sacrifice, including the acceptance of limitations
on constitutionally granted privileges.
These speech restrictions on judges are typical, unremarkable, and
extend to their involvement in the political realm as well. In
reprimanding a state district court judge for posting a sign supporting the
county sheriff’s reelection, Iowa’s Supreme Court held:163
The strength of our judicial system is due in large part to
its independence and neutrality. . . . These twin qualities
help remove outside influences from judicial decisionmaking, and promote public respect and confidence in
our system of justice. Yet, judicial independence does
not come without some personal sacrifice by judges.
Judicial independence and neutrality require judges to
limit or abstain from involvement in a variety of
activities commonly enjoyed by others in the
community, including politics.
Justice Scalia, in White, concluded that a judicial candidate’s mere
statement about a legal issue did not sufficiently serve the need to
preserve impartiality for or against a party, or its appearance, contending
that no one expects judges to be without some preconceptions about the
law.164 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s view, and despite the robust
campaign finance protections for ordinary political candidates in
Buckley165 and McCutcheon,166 the Supreme Court has taken a different
approach in judicial campaign finance cases. In Caperton, a majority
recognized that a litigant’s contribution of $3 million to alter the West
Virginia supreme court’s composition caused a risk of actual bias, not to
speak of the fact that two-thirds of the state’s voters did not believe that
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167

the successful candidate could be impartial.
Justice Kennedy
concluded that due process required “an objective inquiry into whether
the contributor’s influence on the election . . . ‘would offer a possible
temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true.’”168 In Williams-Yulee, Chief Justice
Roberts’ opinion for the Court emphasized that judges “are not
politicians,”169 and that a rule prohibiting judicial candidates from
personally soliciting funds was supported by the “compelling interest in
preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”170 Roberts
added that states may appropriately conclude “that the public may lack
confidence in a judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or favor
if he comes to office by asking for favors.”171 He noted that personal
solicitation by a judicial candidate puts those solicited in a position to
fear retaliation if they do not contribute, and that potential litigants
would then fear that the integrity of the judicial system was
compromised:172 “A State’s decision to elect its judges does not require it
to tolerate these risks. The Florida Bar’s interest is compelling.”173
If the Supreme Court has concluded that the appearance of
impartiality is materially damaged by a candidate simply asking for
favors, then the Court should similarly conclude that in the judicial
election context, a state has a compelling interest to reduce or curtail the
actual receipt of favors in the form of campaign cash. As described
above, the public firmly believes that judicial contributions affect judges’
decision-making,174 so the appearance of impartiality is patently affected
by campaign donations by litigants, attorneys, and special interest
groups. Even more important is the empirical research demonstrating
that judges are in fact more impartial when they are not dependent on
private campaign contributors or when those judges are subject to
mandatory recusal rules.175
The Supreme Court recognized in Caperton and in Williams-Yulee
that judicial elections are fundamentally different from elections for
political posts, and that the need for judicial independence and
impartiality may provide a compelling interest for restrictions that would
not be legally acceptable with respect to political candidates.
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Notwithstanding Buckley and McCutcheon, we believe that the Court
might well uphold a code of judicial conduct provision capping total
judicial campaign expenditures, and/or a state law or court rule
prohibiting or limiting independent expenditures on judicial campaigns.
We contend that one or more state supreme courts should impose tight
judicial campaign expenditure limits, and one or more legislatures—or
the courts themselves—should enact statutes curtailing independent
expenditures in judgeship races.
Some might argue that legislative action is required to govern
independent campaign contributions because the courts (and their
rulemaking authority) have limited control over contributors who are
outside the judicial branch, i.e., contributors other than judges and
attorneys. However, we assert that massive judicial campaign
contributions and expenditures pose such a serious threat to judicial
independence and the public’s confidence in the justice system, that state
supreme courts have sufficient inherent authority to impose strict judicial
campaign expenditure limits and limits on outside independent spending
in court races. Notwithstanding legislative assertions to the contrary,
state high courts have long asserted and exercised inherent powers to
safeguard the judicial branch, including those powers “essential to the
existence, dignity, and functions” of the judicial system.176 In protecting
and overseeing the judiciary, courts across the country have long
assumed control of rulemaking,177 the admission and discipline of
attorneys,178 the management and regulation of the judicial system
(including judges and staff),179 and, controversially, the mandatory
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WASH. U. L.Q. 459, 477 (1937).
178
See, e.g., In re Integration of Bar of Haw., 432 P.2d 887, 888 (Haw.
1967); Martin v. Davis, 357 P.2d 782, 787–88 (Kan. 1960); In re Greathouse,
248 N.W. 735, 737 (Minn. 1933); In re Integration of State Bar of Okla., 95 P.2d
113, 116 (Okla. 1939); Belmont v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 511 S.W.2d 461, 464
(Tenn. 1974).
179
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 363 N.E.2d 652, 659–60
(Mass. 1977); In re DeSaulnier, 279 N.E.2d 296, 307–08 (Mass. 1971); State ex
rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 101–02 (Mo. 1970) (Per Curiam); Zylstra v. Piva, 539 P.2d 823, 826–27 (Wash. 1975); In re Kading, 235
N.W.2d 409, 414 (Wis. 1975); see generally James D. Cameron, The Inherent

120

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 25:2

provision of funds to support the judicial branch when lack of adequate
funding threatens the viability of the courts.180 Although some have
contended that by taking these self-protective actions judges have
pushed their way into policy-making that ought to reside in
legislatures,181 strong inherent judicial powers have been firmly
established in most states.182 In our view, if a state supreme court
concludes that its legislature has failed to enact adequate controls over
judicial campaign expenditures and outside contributions, and the court
concludes that the lack of adequate contribution and spending limits
endangers the judiciary, that court has sufficient authority to impose
those controls by court rule. Attached in Appendix [A] is a suggested
court rule implementing those limits. Although a rule such as the one we
recommend might face a First Amendment challenge, we believe that
there are solid arguments for upholding a judicially-imposed
regulation.183
D.

Moving Ahead with Public Funding.

Our final recommendation is that state legislatures move forward
with the adoption of public funding systems for judicial campaigns.
Although lawmakers have pulled back from such programs for financial
reasons,184 the research suggests that they are effective in promoting
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180
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1971); In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 170–71 (Wash. 1976); see
generally Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979,
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14 (2004).
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31, 65–68 (1982).
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From a strategic standpoint, those defending Free Speech challenges
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impartial decision-making
and improving public perceptions of
judicial fairness.186 If controls on independent expenditures are added to
existing limits on donations to judicial campaigns, the cost of court
elections will remain at modest levels and public financing systems
should not present a substantial budget hurdle.
Further, if the Supreme Court is willing to accept that states have a
compelling interest in preserving judicial impartiality (and its
appearance) such that they can control total campaign expenditures and
independent spending, then the Court should similarly permit public
funding programs for judicial elections to use the matching mechanism
that was not permitted for political elections in Bennett,187 i.e., increasing
the public funding for a judicial campaign as outside expenditures
against a candidate (or for an opponent) increase. Again, a state’s interest
in assuring the public that justice cannot be bought, and preventing the
actual purchase of justice, provides a compelling interest that might not
exist in the context of executive and legislative races.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In 1215, King John’s barons, clearly a special interest group with
substantial resources, were so upset about the influence of money and
power on the courts that they forced the king to promise: “To no one will
we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.“188 In our view, the
political scientists’ findings on the direct and material impact of judicial
campaign cash on judges’ behavior and public confidence in the courts,
provide the compelling interest for state courts and legislatures to take
action. In the spirit of Magna Carta’s commitment to impartial courts,
courts and legislatures should install much stronger controls on
donations to judicial campaigns, total campaign expenditures, and
independent spending on court races. The social scientists’ findings also
provide an adequate basis for public funding for judicial elections. The
universally recognized need to ensure judges’ impartiality and the
appearance of fairness also provides a constitutionally-acceptable basis
for much more robust controls and programs than are permitted in nonjudicial elections. We hope that state supreme courts and legislatures will
step up to the challenge.
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